From Regime Army to National Force: Military Transition and Demobilization

In a post-Kim North Korea, a three-phase transition—stabilization, demobilization, and constitutional reorientation—is essential to transform North Korea’s regime army into a lawful national force and anchor the foundations of a new state.

The fall of North Korea’s regime would leave behind one of the most militarized societies in the world. As of early 2026, North Korea’s armed forces include approximately 1.32 million active personnel and over 560,000 reserve personnel. In addition, paramilitary formations and internal security organs extend the regime’s coercive reach deep into civilian life.

For decades, military primacy has defined the state’s political order, economic priorities, and social hierarchy. Embedded within a party–army fusion system and shaped by the legacy of “military-first” governance, the armed forces have operated as instruments of political enforcement as much as national defense.

Phase I: Stabilization Without Fragmentation (0–72 Hours)

In the immediate aftermath of regime fall, preventing fragmentation within the armed forces is paramount.

North Korea’s command structure is centralized and politically fused with party authority. If senior leadership collapses abruptly, the risk is not organized resistance but localized autonomy—regional commanders hedging, security organs competing, or strategic units acting independently.

The objective in the first seventy-two hours is stabilization, not restructuring.

Internal actors must retain custody over major formations, strategic assets, and internal security forces. In parallel, a pre-mandated UN-centered stabilization framework—coordinated with key regional governments—should activate liaison and verification mechanisms around critical installations.

The message must be clear: the chain of command holds, fragmentation will not be rewarded, and external stabilization will remain coordinated so long as control is maintained.

Phase II: Structured Demobilization (Year One)

Once custodial stability is secured, controlled reduction must begin.

North Korea’s military is not structured for proportional territorial defense. It is configured for regime survival, forward deployment, and internal surveillance. Maintaining its current scale during transition would impose severe fiscal strain and perpetuate political imbalance.

Demobilization within the first year should prioritize:

• Phased force reduction through structured discharge programs

• Conversion of selected engineering and logistics units toward reconstruction missions

• Dissolution of explicitly political control organs embedded within military structures

• Reallocation of military budget flows toward salaries, pensions, and reintegration packages

  
  

A credible DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) framework—supported by a UN-centered stabilization architecture and coordinated with international financial institutions—will be essential.

Phase III: Professionalization and Constitutional Reorientation (Years 1–3)

Reduction alone does not secure normalization. Institutional redefinition must follow.

For decades, the North Korean military has sworn loyalty not to a constitutional order, but to a ruling family and party structure. Normalization requires reorienting that loyalty toward law.

During the first three years, reform must embed:

• Civilian oversight under transitional constitutional authority

• Constitutional prohibition of partisan military functions

• Separation of internal security from national defense missions

• Professional training focused on territorial defense and disaster response

• Development of doctrine and command structures compatible with future inter-Korean integration

International monitoring during this period should transition from crisis-based oversight to long-term defense transparency mechanisms, reducing uncertainty for regional actors.

Conclusion

Transforming the North Korean military is unlikely to be easy. For decades, it has served as the foundation of dynastic rule and the primary instrument of political control. Changing its institutional character and strategic purpose will require sustained political will and coordinated international support.