Opinions

Despite Seoul’s engagement efforts, the Kim regime continues to label South Korea as its number one enemy because hostility toward the South is essential both to counter the internal threat posed by K-culture and to strategically pressure a conciliatory South Korean government into concessions in the name of peace.

South Korea’s move to ease imports of North Korean processed foods, coupled with its decision to open public access to North Korea’s state newspaper, points to a broader pattern of policy concessions that risk expanding Pyongyang’s influence and leaving South Korea more vulnerable to North Korean coercion and influence operations.

North Korea’s fierce condemnation of Japan’s record defense budget reflects not just historical propaganda, but deep fear that a more militarily capable Japan—firmly aligned with the United States—could derail Pyongyang’s long-term ambitions on the Korean Peninsula.

While direct U.S. military regime change in North Korea is unlikely due to its proximity to China and Russia, news of Maduro’s capture could rapidly erode the perception of regime invincibility among North Korean elites, military officers, and ordinary citizens.

Despite Trump’s willingness to meet Kim Jong Un, Kim cannot risk another fruitless photo opportunity or failed negotiation without a clear guarantee of recognition for his country’s nuclear status.

By asserting that North Korea can strike the U.S. mainland, South Korea’s unification minister risks amplifying Kim Jong Un’s propaganda narrative despite unresolved technical doubts—fueling concerns that Pyongyang may be leveraging blackmail or coercion to shape political behavior in Seoul. A t a recent press briefing in Berlin, South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong‑young stated , “North Korea has become one of only three countries capable of striking the U.S. mainlan

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