Importing Influence: How Seoul’s ‘Peace’ Agenda Serves the Kim Regime
Jan 16
2 min read
South Korea’s move to ease imports of North Korean processed foods, coupled with its decision to open public access to North Korea’s state newspaper, points to a broader pattern of policy concessions that risk expanding Pyongyang’s influence and leaving South Korea more vulnerable to North Korean coercion and influence operations.
South Korea plans to simplify import procedures for North Korean processed foods by easing documentation and inspection requirements, the unification ministry said on Jan 16.
The ministry says the revisions are intended to lay the institutional groundwork for resuming private-level inter-Korean trade, with implementation expected to begin in February.
At face value, the measure is presented as a necessary step to ease inter-Korean tensions
However, following its recent decision to allow public access to North Korea’s state newspaper, this move marks yet another attempt by the Lee administration to open the gate for North Korean influence in the South under the banner of peace and engagement.
Under Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, the ministry seems determined to appeal to the Kim regime, repeatedly signaling goodwill in the name of improving inter-Korean relations.
Yet amid Pyongyang’s firm refusal to reciprocate, the ministry’s posture increasingly resembles supplication rather than diplomacy.
The trajectory points to a deeper strategic purpose aligned with the Kim regime’s interests: expanding North Korean cultural presence in the South as a counterweight to South Korean influence—known as K-culture—inside the North.
As K-culture continues to penetrate North Korea and threaten Kim Jong Un’s control, the regime faces a growing cultural war it cannot win internally. Instead, it seeks to dilute that imbalance by exporting its own narratives and symbols southward.
Whether intentionally—through coercion by the North—or through negligence, South Korea’s unification ministry is serving that objective.
More similar policies will likely follow one by one under the banner of peace. Left unchecked, they will leave South Korea more vulnerable to North Korean coercion and influence operations.
