Why South Korean Unification Minister Sounds Like Kim Jong Un’s Spokesperson?

At a recent press briefing in Berlin, South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong‑young stated, “North Korea has become one of only three countries capable of striking the U.S. mainland.” He stressed that North Korea's new “strategic position” differs from the situation during the 2018 Singapore summit between Kim Jong Un and President Trump, and argued that acknowledging this reality should be the starting point for any policy toward the regime.

The remark closely resembles the rhetoric often used by North Korea itself, prompting the question: was this merely a sober warning about a growing threat, or did it inadvertently echo Pyongyang’s propaganda line?

By asserting that North Korea can now strike the U.S. mainland, Chung’s statement risks amplifying Kim Jong Un’s narrative and lending unintended legitimacy to Pyongyang’s campaign for recognition as a nuclear state.

Yet the evidence remains inconclusive. Experts continue to question whether North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missiles can reliably reach the U.S. mainland, pointing to unresolved issues in re-entry stability, payload integration, and long-range accuracy.

Why, then, did Chung choose to frame North Korea’s capabilities in such definitive—or even exaggerated—terms?

His rhetoric mirrors talking points routinely used by North Korea and Russia—raising concerns the current Lee administration may be ideologically drifting closer to authoritarian regimes rather than standing firmly with its allies and the free world.

For years, certain South Korean elites have engaged extensively with Pyongyang, making multiple visits under the banner of “inter-Korean cooperation.” Yet such repeated contact may have given North Korea leverage—raising the very real possibility of blackmail or coercion being used to influence political behavior in Seoul.

Pyongyang has a long history of exploiting personal connections, information, and past dealings to manipulate foreign counterparts, and South Korea’s political class is not immune to such tactics. This is a typical playbook of communist regimes in history.

If this troubling pattern continues, Chung risks intentionally or unintentionally becoming Kim Jong Un’s de facto messenger abroad, helping Pyongyang advance its long‑term goal of being accepted by Washington as a legitimate nuclear power.

The United States and its allies must resist this narrative trap. Recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state would reward its coercion, undermine decades of non‑proliferation effort, and embolden other rogue regimes. The free world must stand firm, expose manipulation wherever it appears, and meet Pyongyang’s deception with unwavering resolve.