Does President Trump Really Want to Meet Kim as He Claims?

Explore why President Trump’s remarks about meeting Kim during his summit with President Lee are diplomatic gestures rather than genuine intent—and how his North Korea policy could shift dramatically to outlast the regime

Key Insights

• Trump’s Remarks Are Diplomatic Gestures: At his summit with Lee, Trump said he’d like to meet Kim and that he “gets along with him really well.” While this may appear as eagerness, his remarks are better understood as diplomatic gestures, not genuine intent.

  
  

• Structural Deadlock on Denuclearization: The U.S. cannot accept North Korea as a nuclear state due to global nonproliferation norms, while Kim cannot give up his arsenal for regime survival. This creates a deadlock that makes genuine dialogue nearly impossible.

  
  

• Distrust Toward the Lee Administration: Despite Lee’s calculated praise, Trump distrusts the Lee administration, as shown in his Truth Social post about political turmoil. Former U.S. officials Carla Sands and Bart Marcois also warn that Lee’s repression at home and tilt toward China and North Korea are dangerous mistakes Trump is unlikely to overlook.

  
  

• Lessons from Moon Jae-in’s precedent: Trump remembers how Moon exaggerated Kim’s willingness to denuclearize, misleading Washington. Having learned from that episode, Trump and his team see Lee’s mediation as another replay of the same tactics.

  
  

• A likely policy shift if Kim persists: If Kim continues deepening ties with Russia and advancing nuclear weapons, Trump may abandon dialogue and turn to bold new approaches—similar to his Iran strategy—including a possible “second Reagan Doctrine” to outlast the regime without a single shot being fired.

On August 25, President Trump met South Korean President Lee at the White House. When the discussion turned to North Korea, Lee voiced hope that Trump would ‘open a new path for peace on the Korean Peninsula.’ Asked about a potential meeting with Kim Jong Un, Trump replied, "Well, I am meeting a lot of people. I mean, it's hard to say that, but I'd like to meet him this year." He also noted, "I get along with him really well.”

A Structural Deadlock

First, Trump knows that Kim is unlikely to respond to any U.S.–South Korean gestures toward dialogue. As Kim Yo Jong, the sister of Kim Jong Un, made clear last month, the regime will not negotiate with the U.S. so long as Washington insists on North Korea’s denuclearization.

It is clear that the U.S. cannot accept North Korea as a nuclear state, because it would unravel the nonproliferation norm. Moreover, it will encourage other rogue regimes like Iran to pursue the same path: pursuing nuclear weapons and demanding recognition.

Seen in this light, Trump’s remarks are not concessions but signals offering Kim an opportunity to change course. As often in Trump’s diplomacy, his rhetoric can diverge from his administration’s actual policy.

Distrust of Seoul

Second, despite Lee’s calculated praise of Trump as a peacemaker, Trump is unlikely to act as Lee hopes—mainly because he does not trust the Lee administration. Just hours before the White House meeting, Trump posted on Truth Social:

Although Trump softened his tone during the meeting, noting rumors about raids on churches and saying “I am sure that’s going to be worked out fine,” the social media post shows he is fully aware of political turmoil in South Korea. His skepticism toward Lee echoes his delayed and lukewarm congratulatory call after Lee’s election.

Concerns and criticisms of the Lee Jae-myung government are growing not only within the Trump administration but also in Washington. For example, Carla Sands (former U.S. Ambassador to Denmark) and Bart Marcois (former U.S. energy official) warned that Lee’s political repression at home and his tilt toward China and North Korea are a dangerous mistake that President Trump and Washington are unlikely to ignore.

Thus, Trump’s display of support should be read as a diplomatic gesture rather than genuine trust in Seoul’s leadership.

The Moon Jae-in Precedent

Third, Trump has not forgotten his experience with former South Korean President Moon Jae-in. Moon positioned himself as a go-between, assuring Washington that Kim could give up his nuclear arsenal. Former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster later revealed that Moon conveyed overly optimistic, distorted messages about Kim’s intentions—claims that even led to disputes with then-Vice President Mike Pence.

Having learned from that episode, Trump and his team clearly recognize when a South Korean administration is playing the same role. They see Lee’s approach not as an honest broker, but as a replay of Moon’s tactics. Trump’s friendly gestures, therefore, should be understood as diplomatic overtures rather than genuine intent.

What Comes Next

Trump said during the meeting with Lee, "I think he (Kim) has a country of great potential, tremendous potential." However, if Kim continues to reject Trump’s offer of an opportunity to change and instead deepens ties with Russia while advancing his nuclear program, Trump may shift course entirely. McMaster has described Trump as a leader who often abandons failed policies in favor of bold new approaches.

We saw this recently with Iran: Trump offered opportunities for negotiation, but once it became clear no breakthrough was possible, he made abrupt, decisive moves. With North Korea, he may act more cautiously given its proximity to China and Russia. Yet he still has tools to pressure and ultimately outlast the regime—perhaps through a “second Reagan Doctrine,” aimed at hastening its collapse without a single shot being fired.

Author: B.J. Choi has long been dedicated to research and policy analysis on North Korea. He is the author of "The Unraveling of the Kim Regime." Previously, he worked with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and Cornerstone Ministries International (CMI), specializing in North Korean affairs. He holds a Master’s degree in Asian Studies from The George Washington University.