
Why the Kim Regime Continues to Label South Korea as the No. 1 Enemy
6 days ago
2 min read
Despite Seoul’s engagement efforts, the Kim regime continues to label South Korea as its number one enemy because hostility toward the South is essential both to counter the internal threat posed by K-culture and to strategically pressure a conciliatory South Korean government into concessions in the name of peace.

Despite the Lee Jae-myung government’s efforts to improve relations with the North, the Kim regime has continued to label South Korea as its number one enemy.
In photos released by North Korean state media on Jan. 19, a major indoctrination facility in Pyongyang displayed banners branding South Korea as the “No. 1 hostile country.” The display was part of anniversary events for the Socialist Patriotic Youth League, designed to incite public hostility toward Seoul.
Since Kim Jong Un declared inter-Korean relations to be those of “two hostile states” at a party meeting at the end of 2023, the regime’s posture toward Seoul has not changed.
Why? There are two fundamental reasons why the Kim regime has little choice but to maintain this stance.
First and foremost, South Korean popular culture—widely known as K-culture—has been steadily penetrating North Korea, significantly eroding the regime’s ideological control over its people, especially its youth.
To counter this quiet but powerful ideological challenge, Pyongyang has doubled down on anti–South Korea propaganda, particularly targeting younger generations. As K-culture continues to seep into every corner of the North through smuggling and informal networks, hostility toward South Korea becomes an indispensable pillar of regime survival—regardless of how conciliatory or pro-engagement a government in Seoul may be.
Second, sustained hostility toward the South serves an offensive strategic purpose. By maintaining a confrontational posture, the Kim regime pressures the Lee government to continually lower its security guard in the name of peace.
Kim Jong Un understands that under the current South Korean administration, the harder Pyongyang pushes, the more Seoul is inclined to concede in order to avoid conflict. As long as the North keeps calling South Korea its number one enemy, Seoul is likely to make greater efforts to appease the regime—potentially even at the expense of the U.S.–ROK alliance.
For both defensive and offensive reasons, the Kim regime will continue to treat South Korea as its primary enemy. If Seoul fails to recognize this strategy and pursues peace through appeasement rather than strength, it risks walking straight into the Kim regime’s trap.






