Why Won’t Kim Jong Un Hold Lee Jae-myung’s Hand?
Jun 11
4 min read
Explore why Kim Jong Un will not likely respond to Lee Jae-myung's engagement policy
Key Insights
South Korea’s new president, Lee Jae-myung, has shifted policy back to engagement—but Kim Jong Un is unlikely to respond.
North Korea’s hostile “two-state” policy is likely to persist, driven by fear of South Korean cultural influence that threatens regime control.
Hanoi’s failure taught Kim that engagement with South Korea is pointless without progress with the United States.
Kim’s deepening ties with Russia provide economic support, further reducing his incentive to engage with the South.
Under Trump’s second term, U.S. pressure and suspicion toward the Lee administration are likely to limit inter-Korean diplomacy.
South Korea now has a new leader. President Lee Jae-myung’s rise has already ushered in significant policy shifts across the board, but none more notable than his approach to North Korea. In contrast to the hardline stance of the previous Yoon administration, Lee is reverting to a strategy of engagement with Pyongyang. During his campaign, he pledged to ease tensions and pursue dialogue with the North.
This policy shift is already taking shape. On June 9, the Ministry of Unification expressed regret over a leaflet campaign by families of North Korean abduction victims, urging an immediate halt and “strongly” requesting the suspension of such activities. Two days later, the South Korean military suspended loudspeaker broadcasts along the border. These moves signal that President Lee’s efforts to re-engage with Pyongyang are already underway.
Yet despite this shift, Kim Jong Un is unlikely to hold Lee's hand. Here are four reasons.
The Two-State Doctrine Is Here to Stay
North Korea’s current policy of treating the South as a separate and hostile state—severing all formal ties—is not a reaction solely to Yoon’s hardline posture. Rather, it stems from a deeper fear: the overwhelming influence of South Korean pop culture, or “K-culture,” within North Korea.
Re-engaging with Seoul risks making it harder for the regime to control its own people—including a military that has already been subtly influenced by South Korean content. For Pyongyang, maintaining hostility is a strategic firewall. The current “two-state” policy isn’t something Kim Jong Un can simply reverse in response to a pro-North administration in Seoul—it’s a core survival strategy designed to block the spread of K-culture and preserve internal control.
The Shame from the Hanoi Summit Still Haunts Kim
Kim Jong Un has little hope left for inter-Korean diplomacy after the collapse of the Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi, which was heavily supported by the Moon Jae-in government. That summit's failure—after high expectations—was a humiliating blow. Reports even suggest that Kim ordered the execution of key officials involved.
The lesson for Kim was clear: improving ties with Seoul is meaningless without a breakthrough in relations with Washington, because only the United States can offer the full package he desires—sanctions relief, economic benefits, and legitimacy on the global stage. That’s why he has since pivoted toward Russia for economic and strategic support—while taking a more hostile stance toward both South Korea and the U.S.
The Russia Factor
North Korea’s deepening alliance with Russia further erodes the incentive for dialogue with the South. Pyongyang has gone so far as to deploy troops to support Russia’s war against Ukraine. In return, Kim has reportedly received economic aid, advanced military technology, and other strategic benefits.
With this lifeline in place, dialogue with the South takes a backseat. Blocking South Korean cultural influence and securing regime survival through Russian support is a far higher priority than pursuing reconciliation with Seoul.
U.S. Pressure Will Undercut Lee’s Engagement Policy
No South Korean engagement policy toward the North can succeed without alignment with Washington. That’s why former President Moon Jae-in invested significant political capital in persuading Trump to meet Kim Jong Un during Trump’s first term.
But Lee Jae-myung now faces a very different Washington. In his second term, President Trump has returned with a sharpened hardline stance toward China—and views the Lee administration with suspicion due to its perceived ideological alignment with Beijing and its conciliatory approach toward Pyongyang. Trump is also well aware of China’s growing influence over South Korean politics, which only deepens his wariness.
This was evident in Trump’s response to Lee’s election victory. Rather than placing a prompt congratulatory call, Trump waited three days. In the meantime, the White House issued a cautious statement—congratulating Lee while also warning against potential Chinese interference in South Korea’s democratic process.
The message was unmistakable. It reflected serious concern about the new administration’s foreign policy orientation—and signaled likely constraints on future U.S.-ROK cooperation regarding North Korea.
Conclusion
Despite Lee’s rise to power and his pivot in North Korea policy, little is likely to change in inter-Korean relations. Kim Jong Un cannot afford to get closer to Seoul without risking the very survival of his regime.
Ultimately, Lee’s engagement strategy may slightly slow the unraveling of the Kim regime—but it will not stop it. The real threat to Kim does not come from external pressure, but from the growing cracks within his own system. In particular, his all-in alignment with Russia has deepened the suffering of his people—especially soldiers and their families. The truth is clear: regardless of who holds power in Seoul, the internal crumbling of the Kim regime is already underway and cannot be stopped.
Author: B.J. Choi, founder of NVNK, obtained his Master's degree in Asian Studies from the George Washington University. He previously worked for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS), and Cornerstone Ministries International (CMI) on North Korea issues.
